

The Epistemological Foundations of Modern Humanities in Light of the Intellectual Modeling Methodology (MANHAJ)

Posterior Inquiry, the Origin Point, and the Problem of Generalizing the Historical Model

Scientific Research Paper — Paper 03

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About This Paper

This paper examines the epistemological foundations of modern humanities from the perspective of the Intellectual Modeling Methodology (MANHAJ). It does so by examining the references, origin points, and conceptual domains within which certain intellectual projects are organized, and by analyzing their effects on the production of meaning and the direction of the cognitive act.

The paper focuses on the distinction between A Priori Inquiry, which examines the conditions underlying the foundation of knowledge and its references, and A Posteriori Inquiry, which proceeds from existing knowledge or an established framework. It also examines the problem of generalizing the historical model.

The paper draws on a number of intellectual projects as applied cases through which to test methodological examination tools. Its aim is to assess MANHAJ's capacity to uncover the foundational structure underlying the production of meaning.

This paper forms part of the broader research programme of the Intellectual Modeling Methodology (MANHAJ). It is neither a comprehensive presentation of the methodology nor a substitute for its reference document. Rather, it addresses a specific research problem through which independent papers contribute to the further theoretical and applied development of the methodology.

Relationship to the MANHAJ Reference Document

This paper develops a specific research application of the methodology presented in the reference document:

Messeoud, Faouzi. Intellectual Modeling Methodology (MANHAJ) — Reference Document — Version 1.0. Zenodo, 15 September 2026. DOI: [10.5281/zenodo.22769627](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22769627).

The paper draws on the conceptual and methodological framework established in the reference document, particularly the relationship between Doctrinal Centrality, the Origin Point, the Conceptual Domain, the Coordinate of Meaning, the Cognitive Act, A Priori Inquiry, and A Posteriori Inquiry. It is an independent scientific study in terms of its subject and research problem, but it does not stand apart from the theoretical framework that guides the application of the methodology, nor does it replace the reference document.

Citation

Messeoud, Faouzi. "The Epistemological Foundations of Modern Humanities in Light of the Intellectual Modeling Methodology (MANHAJ): Posterior Inquiry, the Origin Point, and the Problem of Generalizing the Historical Model." Scientific Research Paper, Paper 03, Version 1.0, 2026.

The scientific paper begins on the following page.

Abstract

This paper examines the theoretical foundations of knowledge in the modern humanities by questioning the referential conditions that organize the production of knowledge, the ways in which reality and its problems are approached, and the paths through which reality is interpreted and judged. The study does not limit itself to criticizing the results or interpretations offered by intellectual projects. Instead, it proceeds to examine the Origin Point, the references, and the concepts that frame the inquiry into a subject, as well as the extent to which these foundations are subjected to a priori examination.

The paper begins with two interrelated hypotheses. The first concerns the possibility that Western centrality continues to operate within certain bodies of knowledge in the humanities and within intellectual projects, even when those projects take criticism of the West or modernity as their subject. This may occur when they criticize particular outcomes without questioning the referential assumptions that frame the production of knowledge. The second hypothesis concerns the possibility that certain paths of knowledge production fall into methodological circularity (begging the question), when the subject under examination, or a criterion derived from it, becomes both the Origin Point and the standard of judgment, without that criterion being subjected to independent examination.

The paper employs the Intellectual Modeling Methodology (MANHAJ) as a framework for examining these two hypotheses, drawing on the concepts of Doctrinal Centrality, the Origin Point, the Conceptual Domain, the Coordinate of Meaning, the Cognitive Act, the Law of the Dual Direction of Inquiry—A Priori and A Posteriori—and the Law of Rightness. The two hypotheses are examined through contrasting models of intellectual projects.

The paper's contribution lies in proposing a shift from criticizing the products of knowledge to examining their foundational models. This makes it possible to question references that may reproduce dominant epistemic centralities and to identify methodological shortcomings that may limit the capacity of certain forms of knowledge to explain and address problems.

Keywords: Intellectual Modeling Methodology; MANHAJ; modern humanities; Doctrinal Centrality; Origin Point; Conceptual Domain; A Priori and A Posteriori Inquiry; Western centrality; methodological circularity; begging the question.

1. Introduction: From Criticizing Results to Examining Foundations

Knowledge produced by the modern humanities addresses the human being, society, history, politics, and culture. It offers multiple interpretations of human phenomena, as well as conceptions of the causes of problems, the conditions of change, and possible means of addressing them. A significant part of intellectual criticism has taken the form of questioning these interpretations and results, comparing schools and methodologies, or exposing contradictions that emerge in their application. Yet focusing on the domain of results—that is, reality—may overlook the domain of causes that produced that reality. As a result, the current cognitive act may remain unaware of the

conditions that organize its own production, leaving those conditions outside the scope of criticism itself.

This paper therefore begins with a foundational question: Is criticizing the results and interpretations produced by the humanities sufficient to overcome their limitations, or does this also require examining the Origin Point and the references that determine what can emerge as an object of knowledge, how it is understood, which concepts and coordinates are used to approach it, and which criteria are used to judge it?

The question is not merely about distinguishing between different methodologies or conflicting results. It concerns a level that precedes such differences: the foundations that make certain concepts and criteria possible and operative within an intellectual project, and that determine the range of questions it can ask and the results it can reach. Two projects may differ in their interpretation of a particular phenomenon while sharing implicit foundational assumptions that neither examines. A project may also announce its criticism of an epistemic system while continuing to use that system's concepts and criteria to define the problem and formulate alternatives.

This does not mean that every criticism of reality remains captive to reality's own conditions, nor that every concept originating in a Western context necessarily embodies Western centrality. Rather, it means that the relationship between reference, concept, and result must be examined, and that a project's declared affiliation or political and intellectual position is not, by itself, sufficient to determine its foundational structure.

In this context, the paper proposes treating epistemological foundation as an object of methodological examination, rather than merely as a historical or theoretical background that can be taken for granted. This requires questioning the Origin Point relative to which inquiry is organized, the Conceptual Domain within which it operates, the Coordinates of Meaning that determine the subject's position within that domain, and the Cognitive Act through which meaning or judgment is produced, as well as the transition between a posteriori and a priori modes of inquiry.

1.1. The Central Research Problem

The central research problem can be formulated as follows:

To what extent does knowledge in the modern humanities operate within foundational frameworks that treat the Origin Point and the references used to interpret reality as given and unquestioned? What effect does this have on the continued operation of Western centrality in certain intellectual projects, and on the possibility that some paths of knowledge production may fall into methodological circularity (begging the question)?

Two principal questions follow from this:

First: Can the influence of Western centrality persist within an intellectual project that takes criticism of the West or modernity as its subject, if the project continues to rely on certain references, concepts, and coordinates through which Western knowledge is organized, without subjecting them to foundational examination?

Second: Can failure to examine the Origin Point, its relationship to the subject, and the criteria of judgment lead to a path of knowledge that reproduces its own premises instead of making it possible to examine and move beyond them?

The first question concerns the referential structure and its relationship to epistemic centrality. The second concerns the rightness of the epistemic path and the possibility that it may involve begging the question. Both phenomena may occur within the same project.

1.2. Research Hypotheses

The paper examines two principal hypotheses.

First hypothesis: The reproduction of Western centrality.

The paper hypothesizes that some knowledge produced by the modern humanities may continue to reproduce Western centrality, not necessarily through an explicit endorsement of it, but through reliance on certain Western references, concepts, and coordinates as unquestioned frameworks for understanding and interpreting reality. This possibility may arise even in projects that criticize the West, when their criticism remains focused on particular historical, social, or political outcomes without questioning the foundational conditions that determine the meaning of the problem, the criteria used to judge it, and the limits of possible solutions.

Second hypothesis: Methodological circularity (begging the question).

The paper hypothesizes that certain paths of knowledge production may involve begging the question when the subject to be explained or judged, or a particular conception of that subject, is adopted simultaneously as the Origin Point and the criterion of judgment, without an independent examination of the basis that gives the criterion its validity. In cases where the conditions for begging the question are established, this situation leads to the reproduction of the same epistemic framework's premises rather than subjecting them to examination.

1.3. Research Objectives

The paper aims to:

1. Shift attention from criticizing the results of intellectual projects alone to examining the conditions under which knowledge is produced and the foundational assumptions organizing those results.
2. Test the extent to which Western centrality continues to operate within certain intellectual projects, including projects that explicitly criticize it.
3. Examine the relationship between the Origin Point, the subject, and the criteria of judgment, and identify cases in which an epistemic path may involve begging the question.
4. Use MANHAJ's concepts and laws to construct an examination procedure that can be applied to diverse intellectual projects.
5. Determine which conclusions the evidence supports, distinguishing findings specific to the cases studied from general claims about knowledge in the humanities.

1.4. Significance of the Research

The significance of the research lies in the possibility that examining epistemological foundations may reveal limitations that criticism of results alone does not expose. If a problem arises partly from the references that predetermine how reality is understood, addressing the results without examining those references may leave the conditions that produce the problem intact.

From this perspective, the research makes it possible to understand intellectual emancipation as the capacity to question dominant references and move beyond assumptions that otherwise remain unexamined. It also makes it possible to investigate certain shortcomings in addressing problems by determining whether the criteria being used permit their own premises to be examined or instead reproduce them.

The paper does not assume that every failure to explain a problem results from a foundational defect, nor that examining the Origin Point alone is sufficient to solve social, political, or economic problems. Rather, it seeks to determine whether foundational examination reveals additional methodological causes that should be taken into account.

2. The Position of the Intellectual Modeling Methodology (MANHAJ) in the Examination

2.1. The Methodology as an Instrument of Examination, Not a Predetermined Conclusion

The paper employs the Intellectual Modeling Methodology (MANHAJ) as an a priori methodological framework for examining intellectual projects, not as a predetermined position on their results. A project under examination is not judged according to whether it adopts or rejects MANHAJ's terminology, nor according to its affiliation with a particular intellectual or civilizational school. It is examined through its referential structure and its path of knowledge and meaning production.

This requires distinguishing between using MANHAJ's concepts as instruments of examination and assuming that the examination must produce predetermined judgments. The methodology's function is to reveal foundational relationships and the theoretical apparatus that governs them, test the rightness of the epistemic path, and determine what the evidence permits—not to impose a uniform conclusion on all projects.

Likewise, a project's failure to use MANHAJ's terminology does not, in itself, indicate the absence of the functions or relationships to which that terminology refers. Conversely, verbal similarity to the methodology's concepts does not prove that the corresponding conditions are fulfilled in the project. Examination must therefore be based on what the project explicitly states and what follows from it, as well as on relationships that can be established between its references, concepts, and results.

2.2. The Referential Structure of an Intellectual Project

An intellectual project cannot be reduced to a collection of separate opinions or results. Its elements are organized within a structure that determines what it regards as an object of knowledge, which references it adopts, which concepts it uses, and how it moves from premises to judgments.

Examining a project therefore requires tracing the relationships between the elements of this structure rather than extracting a single statement or isolated concept. The project's explicit statements may reveal its references directly, while some implications may emerge from how it defines a problem, the criteria it uses to assess solutions, or the limits it sets for what may count as an acceptable explanation.

Care must be taken not to attribute premises to a project that are not supported by its explicit statements or implications, and not to treat every use of a concept common in Western thought as evidence of subordination to Western centrality. The task is to identify the function the concept performs within the project's referential structure and its position in the process of knowledge production.

2.3. The Two Main Levels of Examination

The paper relies on two relatively distinct levels of examination.

First: Examination of foundational references.

This level focuses on the Origin Point, the references and concepts that organize inquiry, and the extent to which they are subjected to a priori questioning. It is used to test the hypothesis that Western centrality—or another form of centrality—is being reproduced, without presupposing that this is necessarily the case.

Second: Examination of the rightness of the epistemic path.

This level focuses on the relationship between the Origin Point, the subject, the Conceptual Domain, the Coordinates of Meaning, and the Cognitive Act. It asks whether the transition from premises to conclusions allows the basis of a judgment to be examined. It is used to test the possibility of begging the question and to identify where it occurs, if the evidence establishes it.

A finding at the first level does not necessarily entail a corresponding finding at the second. An examination may reveal a dominant reference without establishing that begging the question has occurred. Conversely, it may reveal a defect in a line of reasoning without establishing that Western centrality is its source.

3. The Origin Point as an Entry Point for Examining Foundations

3.1. The Importance of the Origin Point

The Origin Point -The Fourth Law in MANHAJ / Section 9.1 of the Reference Document - occupies a fundamental position in examining epistemic structure because it is the reference relative to which inquiry and measurement are organized and relationships between the subject and other elements are determined. The question is not limited to whether a project explicitly declares a particular Origin Point; it also concerns whether the actual Origin Point is visible in its structure or implicit in its concepts and criteria.

A project may discuss a particular subject while defining its meaning and boundaries on the basis of a reference that it does not explicitly identify. It may also declare that it adopts multiple references, while its actual mode of operation reveals a criterion that has final priority in interpreting

phenomena and judging them. A project's own description of itself is therefore insufficient to identify its Origin Point; the functions performed by its references in the process of knowledge production must also be examined.

3.2. Distinguishing Doctrinal Centrality from the Origin Point

Doctrinal Centrality—the second theory in MANHAJ, discussed in Section 6.2 of the reference document—must be distinguished from the Origin Point. Doctrinal Centrality concerns the higher-order referential structure through which a worldview is organized, whereas the Origin Point refers to the reference relative to which inquiry and measurement are organized within a particular epistemic path.

The two may be related within a project, but this does not mean that the concepts are identical. Nor can Doctrinal Centrality be identified merely by extracting a single criterion or observing an isolated result. It requires an examination that establishes the reference's position within the project's overall structure and its relationship to the other elements.

This distinction requires the examiner to ask which reference organizes the project's worldview, which Origin Point governs the interpretation of the subject, and how the two relate to one another. It must not be assumed that the declared Origin Point is necessarily the project's actual Doctrinal Centrality, or that every criterion used by the project constitutes an independent Doctrinal Centrality.

3.3. Forms of the Relationship Between the Origin Point and the Subject

For the purposes of procedural examination, three forms of relationship between the Origin Point and the subject can be distinguished:

1. An Origin Point independent of the subject: The reference relative to which inquiry is organized is distinct from the subject to be explained or judged.
2. An Origin Point linked to the subject's position or state: Inquiry is organized by reference to the subject's position or the state in which it exists. This does not necessarily mean that the subject itself is the sole criterion for judging it.
3. An Origin Point linked to a property of the subject: A particular property of the subject is assigned the role of the reference governing judgment. This property may become the sole criterion used to evaluate the subject itself.

This classification is an analytical procedure intended to guide examination; it is not an independent law to be added to the laws of MANHAJ.

3.4. When Does the Subject Become the Measuring Standard?

The problem of “the subject as its own measuring standard”—that is, the occurrence of a logical impossibility in the form of circular reasoning or begging the question—arises when the subject is no longer merely an object of inquiry, but the conception adopted of that subject becomes the ultimate reference by which the subject itself is evaluated, without an independent examination of the basis that gives that conception its validity.

Two hypothetical examples may clarify this issue.

Example 1: The maximization of pleasure. If increasing pleasure is regarded as the highest criterion for judging actions and policies, the foundational question is not simply whether pleasure is important. It is what gives the maximization of pleasure its authority as the final standard of judgment. Is that basis examined, along with the criterion's limits and relationship to other criteria, or is it treated as an ultimate reference that requires no justification?

Example 2: The maximization of human benefit. If systems and conceptions are evaluated according to the benefit they provide to human beings, the examination must consider how benefit is defined, which reference determines its meaning, and whether that definition is independent of the conception being evaluated. If a project derives the meaning of benefit from the very conception it seeks to assess and then uses that meaning to justify the conception, the possibility of begging the question may arise.

These examples do not establish that begging the question occurs merely because pleasure or benefit is adopted as a criterion. A project may define a clear criterion, justify its choice, and subject it to review and criticism. The problem arises only when the evidence shows that the criterion derives its validity from the subject itself and is then used to judge that subject without an independent examination of its underlying basis.

3.5. The Implicit Origin Point

A project may not explicitly declare its Origin Point. It may describe itself as neutral, critical, or pluralistic while its production of knowledge is organized around an implicit reference. This does not mean that every undeclared reference necessarily constitutes a defect: some references may be understood from the research context or its stated premises. Indeed, no field of inquiry or measurement exists without a reference point.

Identifying an implicit Origin Point becomes necessary when that reference influences the meaning assigned to the subject, the ranking of criteria, the restriction of possible questions, or the exclusion of alternatives without sufficient justification.

Indicators that may guide the examination include:

- The reference on which the project relies when defining the problem.
- The criterion that resolves conflicts between interpretations or alternatives.
- The conception that determines what counts as progress or regression, success or failure.
- The boundaries the project establishes for what may be considered knowledge or an acceptable explanation.
- The premises the project uses to criticize others without subjecting those same premises to examination when evaluating its own work.

These are indicative factors, not an automatic checklist for issuing judgments. Every conclusion must be grounded in what the project states and what follows from it, while distinguishing explicit declarations from inferences drawn from its structure.

3.6. The Origin Point and Begging the Question

The Origin Point is connected to the problem of begging the question when the basis on which a judgment rests becomes part of the very subject about which the judgment is to be established, and that basis is then used to justify the conclusion without independent examination.

For example, a project might adopt a particular conception of the human being as its Origin Point, define benefit or success according to that conception, and then judge the validity of the conception itself by whether it achieves the benefit defined on the basis of that same conception. The examination must ask whether the conclusion has already been incorporated into its premises.

Establishing that begging the question has occurred, however, requires more than identifying a relationship between the subject and the criterion. It is necessary to specify the premise on which the conclusion rests, explain how that premise contains or presupposes the conclusion, or show how the epistemic path prevents examination of the basis that gives the criterion its validity.

The purpose of examining the Origin Point is therefore not to exclude every criterion related to the subject. It is to determine whether the relationship between them permits independent examination of the basis of judgment, or instead allows the subject to judge itself according to a criterion that cannot be questioned within the adopted epistemic path.

4. A Priori and A Posteriori Inquiry and the Problem of Taking What Exists for Granted

4.1. Distinguishing the Two Directions of Inquiry

MANHAJ distinguishes between two directions of inquiry: A Priori and A Posteriori Inquiry. This distinction is addressed by the second law in MANHAJ, Section 8.2 of the reference document. It does not concern chronological order alone; rather, it concerns the position of inquiry in relation to the conditions that organize knowledge.

A Posteriori Inquiry approaches the subject, reality, or results from within an established framework. It examines what has taken place within that framework, analyzes its relationships and problems, and proposes explanations or solutions within its boundaries. A Priori Inquiry, by contrast, examines the foundational conditions that organize inquiry itself, including the Origin Point, the references, and the concepts that determine what appears as an object of knowledge and how it is approached.

This distinction does not mean that A Posteriori Inquiry is without value, or that A Priori Inquiry makes the analysis of facts and details unnecessary. Each has its own function. The problem arises when an established framework is treated as a given beyond examination, so that inquiry does not go beyond analyzing what the framework produces or attempting to reform it from within.

4.2. Criticizing Results Without Questioning Their Conditions

Criticism of an intellectual project may focus on the results reached by another project or on the social and political effects of applying a particular conception. Such criticism may nevertheless remain limited if it does not address the references that determine how the problem is understood and the criteria used to evaluate alternatives.

For example, a project may criticize a social policy because it failed to achieve the expected benefit, while leaving unexamined the meaning of benefit it adopted and the basis on which benefit became the final criterion of judgment. Another project may criticize a historical conception because it fails to explain certain facts while continuing to accept premises that predetermine what counts as an acceptable historical explanation.

4.3. Taking What Exists for Granted and Generalizing the Historical Model

Another problem arises when a particular historical model becomes a general standard for understanding societies and determining their paths of development. A specific historical trajectory may be treated as the natural or necessary path to progress, while the trajectories of other societies are interpreted as delays relative to that path or deviations from it.

The examination here is not simply about the usefulness of historical comparison. It asks whether the model being used is an explanatory instrument open to revision, or an Origin Point against which other societies are measured without questioning the conditions under which it emerged or the limits of its validity.

The generalization of a historical model may be associated with Western centrality if evidence establishes that a particular Western historical experience is assigned the position of a universal standard and that concepts derived from it determine the meaning of progress and regression for other societies. This relationship must not, however, be presumed whenever a Western model is used. The judgment requires examining the function of the model within the project's structure and the extent to which it is subjected to questioning.

4.4. The Relationship Between A Priori and A Posteriori Inquiry

Foundational examination does not require the elimination of A Posteriori Inquiry. Rather, it seeks to determine the relationship between the two. Examining results and facts is necessary, but their interpretation is influenced by the referential conditions that organize inquiry. Conversely, discussing references alone is insufficient without examining how they operate in interpreting a particular subject.

Examining a project therefore requires moving between two levels: from its explicit statements and results to the references that organize them, and then back to the results to verify the effect of those references on the process of knowledge production. This movement helps prevent A Priori Inquiry from becoming reflection detached from evidence, or research from being reduced to describing results without questioning their conditions.

5. Concept, Meaning, and the Conceptual Domain

5.1. The Unity of a Word Does Not Establish the Unity of Meaning

The fact that two projects use the same word does not suffice to establish that they use the same concept with the same meaning. The function of a word may differ according to the reference that organizes a project, the Conceptual Domain within which it operates, and the relationships it establishes with other concepts.

Examining concepts therefore involves more than their dictionary definitions or explicit statements about them. It also requires examining their position within the project's structure and the function

they perform in producing meaning and judgment. For example, two projects may use the word “progress,” while one defines it through a particular historical scale and the other through a different criterion. Their relationship cannot be determined merely by the identity of the word. (See Section 6.3.3 of the reference document.)

5.2. The Conceptual Domain

Within the framework of this examination, the Conceptual Domain—discussed in Section 6.3.4 of the reference document—refers to the field within which the concepts and relationships used by a project to approach its subject are organized. This domain determines what can be connected to what, which questions can be asked, and which interpretations can be accepted or excluded.

Examining the Conceptual Domain requires identifying the project’s central concepts, the relationships connecting them, and the reference that gives them their functions. It then requires testing the consistency of these relationships with the declared or inferred Origin Point.

The boundaries of a Conceptual Domain are not presumed to be defective merely because they are limited; every project operates within a particular domain. The methodological question arises when those boundaries lead to the exclusion of alternatives or questions necessary for understanding the subject, without sufficient justification for that exclusion.

5.3. The Coordinate of Meaning

The meaning of a concept is not determined solely by the word used to express it, but by its position within the Conceptual Domain and the relationships in which it is organized. Examining the Coordinate of Meaning therefore involves identifying the concept’s position within the project’s structure and its relationship to the Origin Point and the references that determine its function. (See the Theory of Meaning, Section 6.3 of the reference document.)

A project may change the meaning of a familiar concept without changing the word itself, or use a concept drawn from another field within a new network of relationships. Examination must therefore trace the concept’s actual function rather than assume that its meaning remains constant because its wording remains unchanged.

5.4. From Concept to Cognitive Act

The importance of examination becomes evident when a project moves from using concepts to constructing judgments and explanations. The Cognitive Act cannot be examined merely by verifying that definitions of concepts exist. It must be examined through the relationship between the Origin Point, the Conceptual Domain, and the Coordinates of Meaning, and through the way these elements are deployed to produce results.

This requires tracing the line of reasoning: What premise does the project begin with? How does it define the meaning of its subject? Which criteria does it adopt? How does it move from these elements to its conclusion? Does this process allow its premises to be questioned, or does it assume their validity in advance?

These questions connect conceptual analysis to the rightness of the epistemic path without reducing examination to a logical assessment detached from the reference that organizes the production of meaning.

6. Differences Between Intellectual Schools and the Possibility of Shared Foundational Premises

6.1. Differences in Results Do Not Rule Out Shared Foundations

Intellectual schools may differ in their interpretations of the human being, society, or history, and may hold conflicting political or ethical positions, without necessarily differing in all their foundational conditions. Different projects may share certain concepts, criteria, or conceptions of the nature of knowledge while deriving different results from them.

Conversely, shared foundations must not be inferred merely from similarities in certain results or terms. Establishing that foundations are shared requires identifying the reference or conceptual relationship common to the two projects and explaining its function in the production of thought and knowledge.

6.2. Criticizing the West from Within Some of Its Own References

An intellectual project may take criticism of the West as its subject while relying, in constructing that criticism, on concepts and criteria that originated within Western intellectual fields. Such reliance alone does not establish that the project is subordinate to Western centrality: it may use a concept critically, reconstruct it, or place it within a different reference framework.

The examination must instead ask whether the project has subjected the concept and its reference to questioning at the foundational level, or merely uses it as a final criterion. It must also examine whether the alternatives proposed by the project move beyond the boundaries of the reference framework it criticizes or continue to operate within its framing.

The criterion of judgment is therefore not the origin of the concept alone, but its function within the project and its relationship to the Origin Point, the Conceptual Domain, and the Coordinates of Meaning.

6.3. Do Not Presume Western Centrality in Every Project

The paper seeks to test the hypothesis that Western centrality continues to operate within certain bodies of knowledge in the humanities and certain intellectual projects. It does not seek to issue a predetermined judgment on all such projects. The examination must therefore allow for different possible findings: some Western references may prove to remain operative within a project; another project may be found to question them or move beyond some of their conditions; or the available evidence may be insufficient to reach a conclusion.

Nor should it be assumed that non-Western references automatically overcome foundational problems, or that affiliation with a particular intellectual tradition guarantees a project's independence. Methodological questioning concerns the project's structure and the functions of its references, not merely its declared identity.

7. A Procedural Model for Examining Epistemological Foundations

7.1. From a General Thesis to Applied Examination

A thesis concerning the humanities as a whole cannot be established merely by presenting it theoretically, nor is it sufficient to select examples that support it in advance. The paper therefore adopts an applied examination of diverse intellectual projects in order to test its two principal hypotheses and determine the limits of what the evidence supports.

The cases published on the MANHAJ Intellectual Projects Examination platform serve as an initial field of testing. The platform's descriptions and preliminary questions are not treated as final findings, but as starting points that guide the research and help identify issues requiring verification against original sources.

7.2. Identifying the Foundational Structure

The examination begins by identifying the explicit content of the intellectual project: What problem does it declare that it addresses? Which references does it explicitly invoke? Which concepts and criteria does it use to define and interpret its subject?

The examination then considers the implications of the project, to the extent that they can be established from its structure, in order to identify the Origin Point that organizes its inquiry. It investigates whether this point is explicit or implicit and how it relates to Doctrinal Centrality, the Conceptual Domain, and the Coordinates of Meaning.

Two separate questions are raised:

First: Does the referential structure reveal reliance on concepts or criteria associated with Western centrality without subjecting them to examination, or does the project examine them, reconstruct them, or move beyond some of their conditions?

Second: Does the project's structure permit examination of its Origin Point and the criteria it adopts, or does it treat them as final premises?

The conclusion is not derived merely from the origin of a concept or the project's declared position, but from the concept's function within the structure of reasoning.

7.3. Examining the Production of Knowledge and Meaning

This dimension examines the relationship between the Origin Point, the subject, the Conceptual Domain, the Coordinates of Meaning, and the Cognitive Act. The path through which the project moves from its premises to its interpretations and judgments is reconstructed. The examination then tests whether the criteria it adopts are sufficiently independent to assess the subject, or whether they are derived from that subject in a way that causes the judgment to reproduce its own premises.

The examples of pleasure and benefit are used to clarify the nature of the question, not to pass judgment on a particular intellectual movement. If a project adopts the maximization of pleasure or benefit as a criterion of judgment, the examination considers the basis of that criterion, how it is defined, its relationship to the Origin Point, and whether the project permits it to be questioned. Begging the question is established only if the evidence shows that the conclusion is presupposed in

the premises, or that the criterion derives its validity from the subject itself without independent examination.

This dimension also considers whether the line of reasoning is consistent with the declared or inferred Origin Point, whether the transitions from premises to conclusions are justified, and whether central premises have been accepted without examination despite their influence on the conclusion.

7.4. Applying the Model to Intellectual Cases

The MANHAJ Intellectual Projects Examination platform contains eight cases that provide different entry points for testing the methodological framework:

1. Wael Hallaq: Examining the modern state, the limits of sovereignty, and the conditions for criticizing the field within which it is organized.
2. Malek Bennabi: Examining the conditions of civilizational renewal and the dynamics of the civilizational system.
3. Edward Said: Examining Orientalism and the relationship between center, representation, and the Western Conceptual Domain.
4. Taha Abderrahmane: Examining trusteeship (i' timāniyya) and the reference that underlies intellectual action.
5. Ali Izetbegović: Examining human duality and the multiplicity of levels of meaning.
6. Mohammed Abed al-Jabri: Examining the critique of Arab reason and the referential field from which it is organized.
7. Abdallah Laroui: Examining historicism, historical backwardness, and the direction of inquiry.
8. Michel Foucault: Examining center, reference, and the production of meaning.

These cases are not ranked, nor is it assumed that every case supports both hypotheses. They are not substitutes for analyzing original sources; rather, they provide initial entry points through which the research questions can be tested. The depth of examination devoted to each case is determined by its relevance to the research problem, the strength of the available evidence, and its capacity to reveal significant differences between projects.

The individual case pages are available at the following links:

- Wael Hallaq: https://www.myportail.com/compare_hallaq_faouzi_messeoud_sovereignty.php
- Malek Bennabi: https://www.myportail.com/compare_bennabi_faouzi_messeoud_dynamics.php
- Edward Said: https://www.myportail.com/compare_said_faouzi_messeoud_orientalism.php
- Taha Abderrahmane: https://www.myportail.com/compare_taha_faouzi_messeoud_logic.php

- Ali Izetbegović:
https://www.myportail.com/compare_begovic_faouzi_messeoud_balance.php
- Mohammed Abed al-Jabri:
https://www.myportail.com/compare_aljabri_faouzi_messeoud_epistemology.php
- Abdallah Laroui:
https://www.myportail.com/compare_laroui_faouzi_messeoud_historicity.php
- Michel Foucault:
https://www.myportail.com/compare_foucault_faouzi_messeoud_reference.php

7.5. Comparing the Cases

After each case has been examined separately, the findings are compared along two dimensions.

The reference and centrality dimension: This identifies the nature of the Origin Point, the project's relationship to Western centrality or other forms of centrality, and the extent to which its references are subjected to examination.

The methodological rightness dimension: This identifies the relationship between the Origin Point, the subject, and the criteria; the possibility of begging the question; and the consistency of the transition from premises to conclusions.

The comparison makes it possible to determine whether certain patterns recur across projects or whether the problems differ from one case to another. Similarity in results must not be assumed to imply identical causes, just as differences in references must not be assumed to rule out a shared methodological defect.

7.6. Comparative Examination Matrix

The findings can be organized into a matrix containing the following fields:

Procedural question	Examination field
What issue does the project declare that it addresses?	Project statement
Which references does the project explicitly invoke?	Declared references
What reference organizes the inquiry?	Origin Point
What higher-order referential structure is revealed by the evidence?	Doctrinal Centrality
Which concepts and relationships define the field of inquiry?	Conceptual Domain
How are the meanings of concepts determined within the project's structure?	Coordinates of Meaning
Does the project examine the conditions of the field, or operate within them	Direction of inquiry

after accepting them?	
Which criterion determines the evaluation or comparison?	Criterion of judgment
Is the transition from premises to conclusions justified, and are the central premises examined?	Rightness of the path
What does the evidence establish, and what still requires further examination?	Limits of the conclusion

This matrix is an instrument for organizing the examination, not a substitute for analysis. Each field need not produce a separate judgment, since some fields may need to be considered in relation to others to establish the connections between them.

7.7. Distinguishing Referential Independence from Methodological Rightness

A project's independence from a particular centrality does not mean that it is free of methodological errors. Likewise, a defect in reasoning does not mean that the project is subordinate to Western centrality. Judgment about the reference must therefore remain distinct from judgment about the rightness of the epistemic path.

A project may adopt a reference distinct from the Western reference framework yet engage in begging the question in some of its arguments. Another project may use concepts that originated in a Western context while examining them and reconstructing them within a different reference framework. The available evidence may also be insufficient to reach a conclusion at either level.

This distinction is necessary to prevent examination from becoming a form of predetermined classification and to ensure that conclusions remain tied to what the analysis has actually established.

7.8. From Case Findings to a General Claim

Examining a limited number of projects is not sufficient to establish that all knowledge in the modern humanities operates in the same way.

The cases may reveal recurring foundational patterns, highlight important differences between projects, or establish a problem within a particular project. Moving from these findings to a general judgment about the humanities requires additional justification that clarifies the limits and grounds of generalization, as well as the extent to which the cases represent the phenomenon being described.

The purpose of the application is therefore not to issue a comprehensive, predetermined judgment on the modern humanities, but to test whether the problems identified by the thesis can occur and to clarify their forms, conditions, and limits.

8. Applying the Procedural Model to Examples of Intellectual Projects

8.1. From the Theoretical Model to Comparative Examination

Examining epistemological foundations requires more than presenting the concepts and laws that govern the examination. It also requires testing whether they can be applied to intellectual projects that differ in subject matter, references, and critical instruments. For this reason, the study draws on applied examinations published on the MANHAJ Intellectual Projects Examination platform and uses their findings to construct a comparison focused on referential structure and the production of meaning, rather than on ranking thinkers or making broad comparative judgments about them.

This test does not require every published case to be analyzed in equal detail. The purpose is not to review all eight projects one by one, but to select cases that permit the study's two central hypotheses to be tested: the possibility that a prior referential centrality remains operative within projects that criticize some of its manifestations or outcomes, and the possibility of methodological circularity when the relationship between the Origin Point, the subject, and the criterion of judgment is not independently examined.

The findings are interpreted in light of the methodological sequence adopted by MANHAJ: Doctrinal Centrality, the Origin Point, the Conceptual Domain, the Coordinate of Meaning, and the Cognitive Act. This sequence is not treated as a formal checklist of separate questions, but as an interconnected structure through which to examine how a reference gives rise to a Conceptual Domain, how meanings are determined within that domain, and how the Cognitive Act that produces judgments and interpretations is organized.

8.2. Criticizing an Epistemic Field and Examining Its Origin Point: The Case of Edward Said

Examining Edward Said's project makes it possible to distinguish between criticizing an established epistemic structure and examining the foundations that made it possible. His critique of Orientalism focused on analyzing the representations of the East produced by Orientalist discourse and revealing the relationship between knowledge and relations of power and authority. The importance of this approach lies in demonstrating that knowledge production is inseparable from the historical and institutional conditions within which it is organized.

The question MANHAJ adds is not about the importance or depth of this critique, but about the position of the Cognitive Act that produces it. Does the critique make the Origin Point from which the epistemic field was established an object of examination, or does it begin within an existing field in order to analyze its discourses, representations, and modes of operation? The answer cannot be derived solely from the fact that the project criticizes the West or from its declared subject. It requires analyzing its reference framework, instruments, limits of questioning, and the extent to which they contribute to retaining the Western model that is being criticized.

In this sense, Said's case tests the hypothesis that some products of an epistemic field can be criticized without necessarily moving beyond that field's foundations. This does not mean that every critique of Orientalism reproduces Western centrality, nor that Said's critique lacks value. It

means that criticizing outputs alone is insufficient to establish that the Origin Point organizing the field's coordinates has been overcome.

Said's case can thus be regarded as an example of a Cognitive Act that criticizes aspects of the West while relying on aspects of the West itself. It is an epistemic path operating internally, without leaving the a posteriori domain.

8.3. From Diagnosing a Problem to Examining Its Criterion: The Case of Abdallah Laroui

Abdallah Laroui's case makes it possible to test the relationship between the Origin Point, the definition of a problem, and the criterion used to judge it. His work on historicism and historical backwardness makes history and historical method central to understanding the problems of modern Arab reality. The examination therefore does not stop at accepting or rejecting historical explanation. It moves to a prior question: What makes a particular historical situation a problem? Which reference determines the criterion of backwardness? And how is the validity of the instrument used to measure that backwardness tested?

These questions reveal that defining a problem is not necessarily a neutral step that precedes knowledge without being affected by it. The definition itself may embody a referential choice and a criterion of comparison. It may also presuppose what counts as progress or backwardness and what should be overcome or recovered. Examination must therefore distinguish between describing historical transformations, interpreting them, and defining them as a problem requiring intervention.

From the perspective of MANHAJ, the decisive question is whether the project subjects to examination the Origin Point that determines the problem and its criterion, or operates within coordinates that have already designated certain circumstances as backward and certain trajectories as standards to be surpassed. This case provides an entry point for testing the hypothesis that a prior reference remains operative. It does not, by itself, justify generalizing a judgment to historicism or to all projects that adopt historical method. The conclusion depends on what the examination establishes about the relationship between the Origin Point, the criterion of judgment, and the direction of inquiry.

Laroui's case may be understood as an example of a Cognitive Act operating within the a posteriori domain, framed by Western models, foundations, and concepts. This raises questions about the soundness of the project's intellectual premises before proceeding to its details. If the foundations are shown to be unsound, there is no need to treat every detail as independently decisive. This follows the Law of Rightness in MANHAJ, the third law discussed in Section 8.3 of the reference document.

8.4. Re-grounding Thought and Modeling Foundational Conditions: The Case of Taha Abderrahmane

Comparing the case of Taha Abderrahmane prevents the examination from being reduced to a simple binary that divides projects into dependent and independent ones, or critical and non-critical ones. Taha's project seeks to re-ground philosophical activity within an Islamic reference framework and gives importance to language, concepts, logic, and ethics in constructing an intellectual horizon that does not treat the Western model as the final reference.

However, the presence of a foundational ambition within an intellectual project does not eliminate the need to determine the level of foundation at which it operates. Reconstructing thought from within a defined reference framework is methodologically different from making the structure through which the reference, Conceptual Domain, and Coordinates of Meaning are organized an explicit object of modeling. This difference does not, in itself, establish the superiority of one project or the invalidity of another. It identifies the location of the question each project addresses.

This case therefore makes it possible to distinguish between re-grounding the Cognitive Act within an explicitly declared reference and examining the conditions through which the reference, domain, meaning, and Cognitive Act are organized. It also reminds us that affiliation with a non-Western reference is not sufficient, by itself, to establish independence in the coordinates of inquiry, just as the use of concepts or instruments originating in a Western field is insufficient to establish dependency. In both cases, the Origin Point and its relationship to the domain, criteria, and path of derivation must be examined.

8.5. What Do the Comparative Cases Add?

The preceding cases do not share identical subjects or conclusions. Said's case highlights the question of criticizing a field from within it; Laroui's focuses on defining the problem and the criterion of historical backwardness; and Taha Abderrahmane's case reveals the difference between re-grounding thought and modeling the conditions under which a field is established.

These differences support the need to keep the two hypotheses separate rather than merge them into a single judgment. The first concerns the possibility that a prior referential centrality remains operative within a project that criticizes some of its outputs or effects. The second concerns the rightness of the epistemic path and the possibility of methodological circularity when the relationship between the Origin Point, the subject, and the criterion of judgment is not independently examined. One possibility may be established in a case without the other; neither may be established. The examination framework does not require a result to be assumed before it is applied.

The comparison also confirms that returning to the roots of a subject does not necessarily mean examining the Origin Point of the field from which the Cognitive Act proceeds. Similarly, criticizing reality or deconstructing its structure is not automatically equivalent to criticizing the reference that determines the coordinates through which reality is approached. Conversely, recovering an explicitly declared reference or constructing an intellectual project from within it does not, by itself, remove the need to examine the relationships through which meanings, criteria, and Cognitive Acts are organized.

The basis of comparison is therefore not similarity in the subjects of the projects or the intellectual environments to which their authors belong. It is their subjection to common methodological questions: What is the Origin Point? How is the Conceptual Domain determined? What are the Coordinates of Meaning? What is the direction of inquiry? And does the path of derivation satisfy the conditions of rightness?

8.6. From Case Analysis to Examination Findings

The value of the cases studied is determined not simply by differences in their subjects or intellectual positions, but by their ability to reveal differences in the structures that organize

knowledge production. The task is not to classify projects as dependent or independent, critical or non-critical, but to examine the relationship between reference, Origin Point, Conceptual Domain, Coordinates of Meaning, and Cognitive Act.

In Edward Said's case, the critique of Orientalism permits questioning the relationship between knowledge, representation, and power and revealing how knowledge production contributes to shaping the image of the Other. Yet moving from a critique of Orientalist representation to a judgment about the foundational structure of the field that produced it requires an additional question: did the project subject the references organizing its coordinates to examination, or did it focus primarily on exposing their functions and effects? This question cannot be settled merely by noting that Said criticizes Orientalism. A distinction must be made between criticizing the practices of an epistemic field and criticizing the Origin Point that determines the conditions of its possibility and the limits of its questions.

Abdallah Laroui's case permits examination of the relationship between diagnosing historical reality and defining it as a problem. The concept of historical backwardness does not perform a merely descriptive function; it is linked to a criterion against which a historical situation is measured and to a direction through which what should be overcome or achieved is understood. The examination therefore extends beyond asking whether the historical diagnosis is accurate. It also addresses the Origin Point organizing the meaning of backwardness and the criterion that gives this description its validity. Nevertheless, the use of the concept of backwardness alone does not prove that the project is subject to Western centrality or involves methodological circularity. That depends on analyzing the basis from which the criterion derives its validity and the extent to which that basis is examined.

Taha Abderrahmane's case provides a different entry point because his project seeks to re-ground philosophical activity within a declared reference framework and question certain assumptions governing modern thought. The comparison shows that re-grounding does not necessarily mean that every level of foundation has become an object of examination, just as a different reference does not, by itself, establish independence in the coordinates of inquiry. This distinction is not a negative judgment on the project; it identifies the question that should be directed to it: which level of foundation does the project address, which relationships does it make objects of examination, and which reference continues to organize its process of derivation?

These three cases perform different functions in the test. Said's case permits examination of the relationship between criticizing a field and criticizing its foundational conditions. Laroui's permits examination of the relationship between diagnosing a problem and establishing its criterion. Taha Abderrahmane's permits a distinction between re-grounding thought and examining the foundational relationships organizing the production of meaning. Their differences do not require the cases to yield identical findings. Rather, the comparison gains its value by directing shared methodological questions toward different intellectual structures.

8.7. Comparative Examination Record of the Three Cases

The following matrix provides a unified record for comparison. It is an initial analytical matrix derived from the directions of examination presented in the paper, not a substitute for documenting the original evidence for each case.

Evidence to be established	Question concerning the rightness of the path	Question concerning the reference and Origin Point	Examination entry point	Case
Locations in Said's work that establish the reference and criteria of criticism	Can the premises of the critique be distinguished from the criteria it uses to judge the field?	Can the critique be confined to exposing the structure of representation, or does it extend to questioning the field's Origin Point?	Orientalism and representation	Edward Said
The definition of historical backwardness and its relationship to the criterion of progress and the direction of inquiry	Is the criterion independent of the judgment it is used to establish?	What Origin Point determines the meaning of backwardness and the criterion by which it is measured?	Historicism and historical backwardness	Abdallah Laroui
Locations in which the reference is re-grounded and concepts and arguments are constructed	How does the project move from its declared reference to its judgments, and are the relevant premises questioned?	What is the foundational reference, and which levels of foundation does the project make objects of examination?	Re-grounding intellectual activity	Taha Abderrahmane

9. Discussion of Findings: Epistemological Foundations and the Limits of A Posteriori Criticism

9.1. Criticizing Results Does Not Exhaust the Examination of Knowledge

The methodological comparison shows that criticizing the results of an intellectual project is not necessarily equivalent to criticizing the conditions that organize their production. A project may criticize a social or historical phenomenon, expose contradictions in its interpretation, or identify the effects of a proposed response, while leaving some of the concepts and criteria that determine the meaning of the phenomenon outside the scope of examination.

This does not mean that A Posteriori Criticism is without value, or that analyzing results cannot reveal the conditions that produced them. It means that uncovering those conditions requires an additional step of examination, moving from results to the relationships that make them possible, and from the content of a judgment to the Origin Point and criteria that organize its production.

This is where A Priori Inquiry becomes important within MANHAJ. It does not mean examining facts chronologically before they occur. It means examining the foundational conditions that derive from a higher Doctrinal Centrality, whether implicit or explicit, and that organize the Cognitive Act. The question thus becomes not only “Is the interpretation correct?” but also “What conditions made this interpretation possible, and have those foundations been subjected to examination?”

9.2. Western Centrality as a Hypothesis to Be Examined

Establishing that a concept originated in a Western context is insufficient to conclude that a project using it reproduces Western centrality. Likewise, a project’s critical stance toward the West is insufficient to establish its independence from Western references. In either case, judgment requires examining the function the concept performs within the referential structure and its role in defining the problem, the criterion of judgment, and the direction of inquiry.

Western centrality must therefore not become a comprehensive explanation used in advance to interpret every case in this paper. It must be treated as a testable hypothesis requiring the relevant reference to be identified, the continuation of its influence within the project to be demonstrated, and the relationship between that influence and the concepts and coordinates organizing knowledge production to be established.

This formulation distinguishes between criticizing the West as a subject and criticizing the referential conditions that may determine how that criticism is constructed.

9.3. Methodological Circularity and the Rightness of the Epistemic Path

The second hypothesis concerns the path of knowledge production and must not be reduced to a question of civilizational or intellectual reference. Methodological circularity (begging the question) is not established merely because a project uses a criterion derived from its subject, nor merely because the conclusion is related to its premises. Establishing it requires demonstrating a relationship in which the criterion supposedly justifying the judgment depends on the judgment itself, or in which the conclusion is presupposed within the premises that are supposed to produce it.

Examining the Origin Point therefore does not automatically establish begging the question; it identifies the relationships that must be tested. The analysis must clarify the location of the alleged circularity, how each side of the relationship depends on the other, and why the epistemic path does not provide an independent basis for justifying the conclusion.

This procedure is connected to the Law of Rightness in MANHAJ, the third law discussed in Section 8.3 of the reference document, whose formulation states: “What is not permissible cannot have valid details.” Applying the law here requires distinguishing between the rightness of the foundation and the correctness of details. Some details of an analysis may be correct or useful, but this does not settle the soundness of the foundation from which they derive. Conversely, all the details of a project must not be invalidated merely because an unresolved foundational question exists. The scope of the consequences arising from the defect, if established, must be determined.

9.4. What Does Comparing Intellectual Projects Add?

The selected cases permit a comparison that does not depend on subject-matter similarity, but on the unity of the examination questions. Differences between the subjects addressed by Said, Laroui, and Taha Abderrahmane do not prevent them from being examined through questions concerning the

Origin Point, the Conceptual Domain, the Coordinates of Meaning, the direction of inquiry, and the process by which judgments are produced.

The value of this comparison lies in preventing epistemological foundations from being reduced to a political position, an intellectual affiliation, or the use of particular terms. It also permits distinctions between a project that re-grounds its reference, one that deconstructs an epistemic field, one that analyzes the formation of criteria and power, and one that defines a historical problem according to a particular criterion. These different functions do not necessarily lead to the same methodological conclusion.

9.5. Limits of the General Conclusion

The selected cases, by themselves, do not permit a judgment on all knowledge in the modern humanities. They allow methodological questions to be tested against specific intellectual models, but they do not constitute a comprehensive survey of all schools, disciplines, or historical transformations through which this knowledge has passed.

Likewise, establishing a foundational problem in a particular project does not prove that all its results are invalid, just as establishing its independence in terms of declared references does not prove that all its lines of reasoning are sound. Every judgment remains limited by the level examined and the strength of the evidence supporting it.

Accordingly, the claim that this paper can defend at its present stage is that examining the Origin Point, references, and direction of inquiry constitutes a relatively independent methodological level alongside criticism of results, and that applying this examination makes it possible to formulate more precise questions about the conditions of knowledge production. Determining how widespread Western centrality or methodological circularity is within the humanities requires documented applied findings commensurate with the scope of such a claim.

10. Conclusion

This paper began with a problem concerning the limits of criticizing the results and interpretations produced by knowledge in the modern humanities, and the possibility of moving from examining what knowledge produces to examining the foundations that organize its production. In this context, the paper employed the Intellectual Modeling Methodology (MANHAJ) to construct a framework linking Doctrinal Centrality, the Origin Point, the Conceptual Domain, the Coordinate of Meaning, and the Cognitive Act, while distinguishing between A Priori and A Posteriori Inquiry and examining the rightness of the epistemic path.

The study proceeded from two relatively independent hypotheses. The first concerns the possibility that Western centrality continues to operate within certain intellectual projects, even when they take criticism of the West or modernity as their subject. The second concerns the possibility that certain paths of knowledge production involve methodological circularity (begging the question) when the relationship between the Origin Point, the subject, and the criterion of judgment is not examined in a manner that identifies the basis giving that criterion its validity.

The comparative framework showed that these two hypotheses require two distinct levels of examination. Examination of references concerns the conditions that organize the coordinates of inquiry and the definition of the problem, whereas examination of rightness concerns the

relationships through which a project moves from its premises to its judgments. Establishing one level does not entail establishing the other, and neither should be presumed to apply in every case.

The paper's methodological contribution lies in proposing an examination record that makes it possible to compare different intellectual projects through shared questions, without reducing them to their affiliations or declared positions. This record allows the analysis to move beyond general impressions toward identifying the Origin Point, the function of concepts, the criteria of judgment, the direction of inquiry, and the nature of reasoning, and then connecting each conclusion to the evidence supporting it.

At the same time, the selected cases do not permit final judgments to be generalized to all knowledge in the modern humanities. Nor do they justify assuming that every project criticizing the West reproduces Western centrality, or that every reliance on a criterion derived from the subject constitutes begging the question.

The principal result of the research is therefore not the prior confirmation of the two hypotheses, but the identification of the conditions under which they can be tested and the demonstration that they must be kept distinct. Examining epistemological foundations makes it possible to question references that may have become unquestioned assumptions and to test the rightness of the transition from the Origin Point to judgment. The strength of this framework ultimately depends on its ability to produce specific findings that remain open to review, qualification, and rejection whenever the evidence does not support them.

11. Core References for the Methodology and Applied Corpus

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